The The publication of increasing amounts of anonymised open source data has resulted in a worryingly rising number of successful re-identification attacks. This has a number of privacy and security implications both on an individual and corporate level.
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 Further findings are that most research in this area has been conducted on Global datasets by American researchers; it is only in recent years that re-identification attacks been attempted by researchers elsewhere in the world.
Introduction
Where traditionally marketeers south insight into customers and their preferences by using techniques such as; psychographic variables (Abduljalil & Hon, 2011) and; market segmentation (Yankelovich & Meer, 2006) , with advances in technology and the advent of ever-larger collections of data, big data has changed all that.
Big data is a term used to describe the analysis and storage of very large amounts of complex data, defined by Gartner as; "high-volume, -velocity and -variety information assets" (Sicular, 2013) that, when processed, can be used to; "enable enhanced decision-making, insight discovery and process optimization" (ICO, 2012) .
Data is the lifeblood of most organisations and it is estimated that up to 80%
of all data held in organisations, can now be classed as big data (Khan, et al., 2014) . Organisations and people produce and use data in many ways to further their businesses or interest. With the use of the Internet and the exponential growth in data being published in the public domain, in excess of 2 billion people worldwide are now connected to the Internet.
The rate of data generated is expected to rise by 40 zettabytes (ZB) by 2020 and continue to rise at a rate of 50-60% annually beyond that (Khan, et al., 2014) . As a result, organisations and individuals now have access to a much wider and varied corpus of data than ever before, this has been termed the 'era of big data' (Berner, Graupner, & Maedche, 2014; Rotella, 2012) .
When data is published in the public domain, the information may be published by private organisations (e.g. Netflix and AOL, (Ohm, 2010) ), or, it may be released by individuals themselves through for example, social media sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter or similar social networking platforms.
Re-Identification Attacks -A Systematic Literature Review
This means that data mining big data has revolutionised how companies find out about individuals, and their preferences. Marketeers have realised that mining big data has the potential to provide them with valuable insight into customer preferences and behaviours in ways not previously possible (e.g.
see (Duhigg, 2012) ).
This is not just true of private companies; public organisations are also realising the value of big data. They however, have entered the big data arena from the perspective of economies of scale and data sharing, seeking to "use technology to join up and share services rather than duplicate them" (The Cabinet Office, 2005, p. 1).
To this end government agencies have, for the last decade or so, been working on a variety of big data projects designed to integrate back office systems with front office services initially through the e-government agenda, then through the transforming government agenda (Patterson, Bennett, & Waine, 2008) (data mining) to discover more about their customers and identify trends (Goodman, 2015) . From an individual perspective this raises questions about how much insight can be gleaned into our lives and indeed, our current situation or whereabouts which in turn, raises serious concerns over the privacy and security of personal information (Ohm, 2010 (Kirby, 2014; Walker, Meikle, & Ramesh, 2014) .
This paper seeks to look into this problem by conducting a systematic literature review (SLR) of research that provides information and details of successful data re-identification cases. More particularly, the paper will also explore whether re-identification attempts are more successful where one or more of the datasets mined include geographical (GIS) or spatial data.
El Emam et al. conducted a SLR in 2011, which sought to identify successful cases of de-identification in the Health Sector (El Emam, Jonker, et al., 2011) .
They found 14 cases where successful re-identification had taken place, 10 of which involved US datasets. Since then research into re-identification has been successful in New Zealand (MacRae, et al., 2012 ) the UK and Canada (El Emam, Buckeridge, et al., 2011) to name but a few.
Furthermore, with the advances in data mining and so much more data being made available on a daily basis (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012) , an updated review would be appropriate. 
Materials and Methods
The review has been conducted following the protocol of Beecham, Baddoo, Hall, Robinson, and Sharp (2008), and the methodology and guidelines of Kitchenham, (Kitchenham, 2004; Kitchenham & Charters, 2007) .
Research Questions
The research questions addressed by the review were limited to four questions that asked firstly how many instances of re-identification have proved successful? Of those, how many datasets were mined to conduct the re-identification tests? Where did the datasets originate?
Finally, did any of the datasets mined include geographical (mapping) data?
However, the findings, as will be shown, lent themselves to much deeper analysis, and therefore, the resulting research questions this article will address are as follows: 
Data Sources
The papers selected for inclusion in the review were selected from a database search of seven electronic databases. The databases were chosen based on a combination of a sample search of databases that held details of strategic literature reviews conducted in the software engineering field, and the recommended databases of Brereton, Kitchenham, Budgen, Turner, and Khalil (2007) and Kitchenham and Charters (2007) . Table 1 lists the seven electronic databases that were searched for relevant papers in this review. 
The Search Process
The papers for inclusion were selected through a process of three phases. Phase one, Identification: the titles and abstracts were read to select suitable papers for inclusion. Phase two, Screening:
abstracts and conclusions were read and scored in accordance with relevance. Phase three, Eligibility: a full review of papers from phase two, including a review of the citations of the selected papers. The inclusion/exclusion decision was made based on the assessment criteria laid out in Table 2 . 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
The review targeted papers where re-identification had proved successful. Only papers written in English were targeted. The key search terms used are listed in Table 3 . To keep focus on answering the research questions, Table 4 lists the subtopics that were excluded in the search criteria. 
Data Collection
At each phase, data was extracted Table 5 shows the data extracted from each study during phases two and three. 
Results
In total 10,873 database entries were searched during phase one, from which 220 papers were selected for inclusion in phase two. From this 50 papers were selected for inclusion in phase three, with an additional 33 further papers reviewed from the citations of the selected papers. By the end of phase three, the final number of papers included in the review was 55. A full list of the papers included in the review can be found in Appendix B.
Research Questions

RQ1: How many successful re-identification attempts have been carried out; which country did the paper originate in and where was it published?
There were 55 instances of successful re-identification attempts. In the majority of cases, the research had been conducted by American researchers (56%). Only 3.6% of the papers originated from UK research teams. The highest percentage of papers were published in Conference papers or Workshops (61%), whilst only 8 of the papers have been published in Academic Journals.
RQ2: What types and how many datasets were mined in the successful re-identification attempts?
The search engine (e.g. Google, yahoo) was the most popular type of dataset used in the re-identification process at 43.6%, followed closely by social network data (32.7%). The data types used were predominantly relational data (54.4%). However, in recent years the use of dynamic data has increased to become the most popular data type with 16 out of 29 papers published between 2011 and 2014 using dynamic data. This corresponds with the increase in Internet and social network usage in recent years (Khan, et al., 2014; Smith, Szongott, Henne, & von Voigt, 2012) .
What was noteworthy was that, whilst the majority of the researchers were American, only 32.7% of the datasets used were US based.
Looking at where the datasets originated, it was found that over half of the attacks were conducted on global datasets such as social networking sites and/or search engines. The number of datasets mined ranged from 1 -16, with one or two datasets proving the most popular at 34.5% respectively. Looking at this over time, it was also evident that more papers have been published in recent years with 40 of the papers published since 2009 (Table 6 ).
RQ3: How many and what types of attributes were used to conduct the re-identification?
The number of attributes used to re-identify were two or three (70.9%).
This corresponds with early research which showed that 2 attributes (1 key attribute and 1 identifier) are required for successful reidentification (Latanya , or where no identifier is available, three key-attributes are required to uniquely identify (L. .
The most common attributes used to aid in the re-identification were key-attributes then sensitive attributes and finally, identifying attributes.
This result is to be expected where data has been anonymised and direct identifiers removed or obfuscated.
Another interesting finding was that when comparing the number of attributes used with the number of datasets mined, that the number of datasets used can be used as an attribute. Whilst, research has proved that multiple attributes are necessary for successful re-identification (Latanya , it was found that in papers that had utilised only one attribute or one dataset to re-identify, this was combined with multiple attributes or datasets respectively in order for the re-identification attack to be successful.
RQ4: Did any of the datasets include mapping (GIS) data?
There were only 3 of the 55 papers included in the review that solely utilised GIS data to re-identify. However, 34.6% of all the attacks used location and/or GIS data as part of the re-identification process.
Other Findings
During phase three, it became apparent that there were different types of re-identification attack depending on the types of data worked with and the research and re-identification strategy used. A decision was therefore made to categorise the results into five types of attack. These are described briefly in Table 7 .
Table 7
Type of Attack Classification
Aggregation of information attack
Using multiple datasets to achieve reidentification by data linking across datasets looking for data overlaps (Clark, 2012; Latanya Sweeney, 2011) 
Inference/Other attack
Where inference or prior knowledge has been used to re-identify (linkage attacks) (Fung, et al., 2010) . This category also covers attacks that do not fit into any of the other categories
Anonymisation
Reversed attack
An attack that involves using background 
Graph/Node attack
Using nodes, labels and/or topology to reidentify 
GIS/location attack
Re-identification using spatial, GIS and/or graph data (Cassa, Wieland, & Mandl, 2008) Following on from this categorisation, a more in-depth analysis of the data collected was conducted. The findings from each of these categories are outlines in sections 4.3 -4.7.
Aggregation of Information Attack
This formed the largest group of attacks with 20 of the 55 papers falling into this category. Furthermore, of those 70% were papers published since 2011.
Whilst this group of attacks consisted of attacks using multiple datasets, in over half the attacks, at least one of the datasets used for the attack included either social network and/or a search engine followed closely by public datasets (used in 9 of the 20 papers).
What is interesting is that whist public datasets were chosen as a dataset of choice in the early work ; Latanya , there appeared to be a dip in popularity of using public data between 2002 and 2010 with no papers in this category utilising public data (see Table 8 ). Then, in 2011, public data once again became a dataset of choice for re-identification attempts. Another finding in this category of attack was that in 58.8% of attacks, the attackers had used identifiers as one of the attributes and this had been combined with a key attribute in 87.5% of attacks. This finding is somewhat surprising given that identifiers should, in theory, have been removed as part of the anonymisation process prior to the data being released.
However, bearing in mind that social networking data has been utilised as one of the datasets of choice in 12 of the 20 papers in this category, individuals' names and/or usernames will have been more widely available and therefore an obvious target for use as an attribute in any re-identification attempt.
Inference/Other Attack
This category covers attacks where the attacker has used existing knowledge to aid the attack. It also covers other types of attack that did not fall into any of the other categories. No particular patterns were found in this category, perhaps due to the variety of re-identification techniques used.
There were 8 papers in this category ranging from re-identification by analysing writing styles (Almishari & Tsudik, 2012) , to using machine learning such as weka software (Hall, et al., 2009) in combination with inference to re-identify users Sramka, Safavi-Naini, & Denzinger, 2009 ).
The most interesting paper in the category however, was a paper detailing how, by analysing electricity meter readings over time, researchers were able to identify patterns and thus, re-identify the household (Buchmann, Bohm, Burghardt, & Kessler, 2013) .
Anonymisation Reversed Attack
The anonymisation reversed category consists of 11 papers where researchers had reversed the anonymisation applied to the original data. The predominant dataset mined in the category were public datasets (54%). In fact it was not until 2006 that researchers attempted to reverse anonymisation on a non-public dataset, when two researchers showed that it was possible to positively re-identify from a non-public dataset when they re-identified users from published anonymised movie ratings (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2006 However, the Netflix case was the first to prove that the scope of reidentification reached beyond public datasets, meaning an attack was possible on any released datasets.
Graph/Node Attack
The graph/node attack category proved to contain the second largest corpus of papers with 23.6% of the papers in the review.
This group of attacks contains papers where researchers have primarily used dynamic data such as social networking or search engine data graphs to conduct the re-identification attacks. 
GIS/location Attack
The last group of attacks is also the smallest with only 3 papers falling into this category. For that reason, no noticeable trends were found.
All three papers had used geographical location tags as one of the attributes and combined this with other data such as tweets or timestamps in the re-identification attempts Goga, et al., 2013; Jedrzejczyk, Price, Bandara, & Nuseibeh, 2009) . Therefore, arguably these papers could equally have been placed in the data aggregation category.
Discussion
The earliest successful re-identification attempt was published in the late 1990's, when Latanya Looking at the trends for using public datasets for re-identification attacks, public data was used in early years and then not utilised for nearly a decade (2002 -2010) . This may be explained by looking at the history of anonymisation and the release of pubic data. Sweeney was the first researcher to identify the link between publically released data and the ability to re-identify. This led to the development of the k-anonymisation algorithm , now accepted as the minimum anonymisation standard for data publishing (Abou-el-ela Abdou, et al., 2013) . This enabled organisations and public bodies to anonymise data prior to release, which could explain the lack of successful re-identification attempts on public data during the middle year group. However, with the increasing number of public dataset being released open source in recent years (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013), more public data has become accessible and thus, public datasets have once again become a dataset of choice for reidentification attempts.
What was interesting was that, in view of the UK government data publishing policy (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013), it should follow that the UK would have more research into this area. Yet, only 2 of the papers found had been written by UK researchers, one of which used a combination of location (geographic) data and dynamic data. In this paper, the research team uncovered both identifiers (names and addresses) and key identifiers (age, occupation and email) by studying users movements and linking these to publically available data from social networks and search engines to successfully re-identify (Jedrzejczyk, et al., 2009) Personnel and ascertain their salaries (Simpson, 2011) . While this was a small study for a particular assignment, it does beg the question; how much more insight could be gained if an attacker was to mine the data in more depth?
Looking at where research originated more generally, it was found that the majority of re-identification attacks originated in the Americas with US and Canada conducting 67.2% of all research found. The remaining body of research was widely spread out in origin; 16.4% originating in Europe, 9% in Asia and 7.3% of research was collaborations between multiple nations.
Furthermore, most of the research conducted outside the Americas, has been carried out in the last 5 years (66.6%). This would indicate that, whilst researchers in the Americas have been looking at this area for quite some time, it is only recently that researchers in the rest of the world have started to take more of an interest.
Limitations
The searches were carried out and scored following the methodology of Kitchenham and Charters (2007) with the primary researcher conducting phases one and two. To guard against potential bias, the selection criteria and quality checks were developed by, and agreed between, the authors. In addition, the protocol defined that for phase two of the review an independent researcher would check and verify the selection. However, due to mitigating circumstances of the independent researcher and time constraints, this did not happen. Rather the primary author conducted all three phases alone , overseen by the second author.
The number of additional papers selected from the citations during phase three appeared rather high and therefore, this was investigated further to ensure the methodology had been followed correctly. What transpired was that, whilst 33 additional papers were selected for inclusion, 42% of those did not pass the relevancy test to be included in the final review. It was concluded that a combination of deepening of subject knowledge and the primary researcher perhaps being overcautious in selecting papers from the citation to make up for the lack of a second reviewer would account for this apparent discrepancy.
Conclusion
This review has shown how the number of successful re-identification attempts on publically available datasets has risen sharply, particularly in recent years with 72.7% of all papers found having been published since 2009. The review has also shown that whilst the Americas have been conducting research in this area for over 2 decades, it is only in recent years that the rest of the world have started to take note and produce papers on reidentification attacks. This would indicate that this area of research is growing.
With the many methods and strategies already used in the re-identification process, it is likely that as researchers become more adept at re-identification, more and more successful attacks will occur. Already there are many organisations who make their living from selling data analytic results or indeed helping companies analyse their own big data (e.g. SAS Institute Inc., 2015).
If these trends are allowed to continue without intervention, no dataset, whether anonymised or not, will be safe from the threat of re-identification.
Thus, much scope exists in this field of study to, not only develop more robust anonymisation techniques, but also put in place better safeguards around publishing any information pertaining to individuals. Furthermore, to fully understand the depth and breadth of this problem, opportunities exist for not only exploring and mining the large corpus of public data available, but also to review the security, privacy and policy implications that re-identification attacks bring. It may even require a completely fresh approach to data publishing, to minimise the risk of privacy breaches occurring in the first place.
References Appendix A -Definitions Data
Data may be classed as structured, meaning it can be stored and managed in an organised database, this type of data can also be referred to as relational data (Baxendale & Codd, 1970) . Relational data consists mainly of text and numbers (Connolly & Begg, 2005) .
Unstructured data on the other hand, consists of large quantities of unorganised data that may contain not just textual information, but also many other types of data. Examples of unstructured data include; social networking data, IP addresses, images and text messages. Unstructured data may change rapidly and for that reason, is sometimes referred to as dynamic data. Dynamic data may be stored and managed in both relational tables and in graph format.
Graphs are arranged into nodes and edges. For instance, in a social networking dataset, the nodes may depict the users and the edges represent their interactions. Thus, for example, graph data may be used to express relationships between users .
Attributes
The information contained within all datasets consists of different types of data, also known as attributes. Attributes can be classified into:
Identifiers; i.e. any data that may directly identify an individual e.g. name or national insurance number;
Key identifiers (also called quasi-identifiers); i.e. any data from which identifiable information may be inferred e.g. when data is linked (Thomson, Bzdel, Golden-Biddle, Reay, & Estabrooks, 2005) .
Sensitive attributes; i.e. individual specific information that may assist in re-identification such as salary, ailment or disability status; Non-sensitive attributes; i.e. any other information within the dataset; and Graph attributes; i.e. the nodes, edges and labels of a graph.
Anonymisation
Anonymisation is the process of masking or removing any identifiable information from within a dataset (Thomson, et al., 2005) . There are many ways data can be anonymised depending on the data type.
For traditional relational data (i.e. data held in organised tables and databases) the most widely used method of anonymisation is k-anonymisation whereby any identifying data is suppressed or generalised.
For unstructured data, k-anonymisation alone is not effective and therefore, other anonymisation methods are used to obscure identifiable information. These methods include clustering and graph modification .
Re-Identification
Re-identification occurs when anonymisation is reversed or de-anonymised, bringing the identifying information to light. Re-identification may be achieved in a number of ways including linking datasets, using prior or background knowledge (Abou-el-ela Abdou, Nermin, & Hesham, 2013) or by comparing longitudinal data to find patterns (Tudor, Almgren, & Papatriantafilou, 2013) .
